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THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMON-LAW WARRANTY OF
REAL PROPERTY AND OF THE INCHOATE
RIGHT OF DOWER
JACOB
I.

J.

RABINOWITZ

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE ENGLISH WARRANTY CLAUSE

In his article The Gage of Land in Medieval England,' Hazeltine includes
warranty of real property among the obligations which, in medieval England,
gave the obligee an in rem charge upon the obligor's property. When a parcel
of real property was conveyed with warranty, all other real property remaining in the hands of the grantor became bound for the "acquittance defence
and warranty" of the grantee, and this charge was not affected by a transfer
of the property to a third party. How this came about, that is, how the
grantor's personal obligation to "warrant defend and acquit" the grantee
became a charge upon his property, even in the hands of an alienee, is not
quite clear.
Nor is this the only feature of the early law of warranty which remains
unexplained. In fact, the origin of the English warranty clause itself
has never been satisfactorily explained. Pollock and Maitland are in accord
with the opinion expressed by Blackstone that warranty was introduced
for the purpose of barring the heir of the grantor from denying the validity
of his ancestor's grant, made without his, the heir's, consent. They believe
that this occurred about the year 1200 when we find that the heir's consent was no longer considered necessary to a valid transfer. To quote from
their History of English Law:2 "Blackstone, Comment. ii, 301 says that
express warranties were introduced 'in order to evade the strictness of the
feodal doctrine of non-alienation without the consent of the heir.' This,
though the word feodal is out of place, we believe to be true. The clause
of warranty becomes a normal part of the charter of feofment about the
year 1200."
There are, however, several difficulties in this explanation. In the first
place, an examination of a large number of twelfth century charters will reveal that, more often than not, these charters, too, contain warranty clauses.3
'Hazeltine, The Gage of Land in Mediez'al England, II. (1904) 18 HAxv. L. Rxv. 36.
22 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1911) 313, n.1.
sSee e. g., 9 BRITISH ACADEMY, RECORDS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY, Records

of the Templars in England its the 12th Century 168-9, 245, 257, 259, 275; RAMSEY
CARTULARY, PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE, CHRONICLES AND MEMORIALS; no. 79, pp. 30, 150;
17 PIE ROL SocIETY PUB. (1195) 26, 47, 50, 62. Furthermore, in 17 PIPE RoL
SocIETY PUBL. 157-8 reference is made to the action of warantia cartae, which was an
action for the enforcement of a warranty, in connection with the levying of fines in
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Secondly. a warranty clause is contained in numerous twelftb-century conveyances by religious houses 4 in which there could be no objection raised
by an heir. Finally. if the purpose of the warranty clause had been to bar
the heir, it would not have taken the form it took. It would have followed
the old clauses in the deeds of the Frankish period on the continent5 and
of the Anglo-Saxon period in England.6 These clauses would have been
most fitting for the purpose of barring the heir from contesting the validity
of a transfer by his ancestor. They attack the problem directly and say,
in so many words, that the heir shall not impugn the transfer, whereas the
English warranty clause of the thirteenth century accomplishes this purpose
by indirection, by imposing upon the heir the positive duty of warranting his
ancestor's grant, from which the negative duty of refraining from attack
upon it flows.
The writer proposes to show that the classical English warranty clause
was copied by the English from the Jews, and that it answered a pressing
need which arose when the Jews introduced new security devices into
England.
Necessity for the W1'arranty Device.
The form of security which was most frequently used by the Jews in
England was known as the "Jewish gage. ' IT This form of security was, as
Pollock and Maitland point out,8 a completely novel institution in England,
in that it gave rights in land to a creditor who was not in possession of the
land. It was a general lien in favor of the creditor upon all the real property
owned by the debtor at the time the debt was incurred. By virtue of this
lien the creditor could follow the property into the hands of an alienee who
acquired the property after the lien attached to it.' Land in England thus
court. The fines are dated 1196, and the fact that at that early date there was already a

well-established remedy for the enforcement of a warranty, and that this remedy was
used in a fictitious action for the purpose of levying a fine, clearly indicates that warranty of real property had been general in England for quite some time before the
of the thirteenth century.
beginning
4
Sce e.g., RAMSEY CARTULARY 150 (a conveyance by the Abbot of Ramsey, made
between the years 1133 and 1160) ; RECORDS OF THE TE.-iPLARS 245 (an exchange of
land between the Templars and Kirkstead Abbey, made in 1161).
5See I ROZigRE, RECuEIL GgNIRAL DES FORMULES 71f. The following is a typical
clause: "Et si quis vero, aut ego ipsi, aut aliquis de propinquis meis, vel qualibet extranea persona, qui contra hanc vindicionem quem ego bona voluntate fieri rogavi, agere
conaverit, inferit inter tibi et fisco soledus tantus coactus exsolvat, et quod repetit
vindecare non valeat et haec vindicio atque volontas mea perenni tempore firma permaniat."
6See KEMBLE, CODEX DIPLOmiATiCUS, Introd. lxiii ff.
"1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND. op. cit. supra note 2, at 473; 2

id at 123; Hazeltine, loc. cit.

supra note 1.
81 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 2. at 115.
915 SELDEN SOCIETY PUVI... SELECT PLEAS CHARTERS AND OTHER RECORDS FROM THE

EXCHEQUER OF THE JEws

(1901)

18, 53, 63.
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became burdened with invisible liens and charges. 10 This situation called
for some such device as a warranty when property was transferred by one
party to another. For, if the land may be burdened with invisible charges while
it remains in the grantor's possession, the grantee will inevitably demand
some sort of protection against the risk of being evicted by one of the
grantor's creditors. The Jews, who brought about this situation, had a
remedy ready for it in the form of an all-embracing warranty clause which,
as we shall see later, had been known to them for many centuries prior
to their settlement in England, and was used by -them in England as elsewhere in every transaction involving a sale .of real property.
So much by way of circumstantial evidence. Fortunately, however, we
need not rely upon this type of evidence alone. The English warranty clause,
in form as well as in substance, bears unmistakable signs of its Jewish
origin, and. through the Jews, some of its elements may be traced to remote
antiquity.
Development of the Jewish Warranty Fonnda .
The standard formula of the medieval English warranty clause reads:
"Ego et beredes et assignati mei warantizabimus acquietabimus et defendemus
predicto . . . et heredibus et assignatis suis contra omnes homines."" Sometimes the words "et foeminas"' 2 are added, and at other times the words
"Christianos et Judeos"' 3 are further added, so that the last phrase in the
clause reads: . . . "Contra omnes homines et foeminas. Christianos et Judeos."
In order to trace the origin and ascertain the significance of each of the
words and phrases in the above formula it will be necessary to review
briefly the history of warranty of real property, beginning with the AssyroBabylonian tablets, through the Aramaic and Demotic papyri found in
Egypt, through the Talmud, and through medieval Jewish sources down to
the thirteenth-century Hebrew deeds from England.
Generally speaking, the warranty formula underwent two distinct stages
of development. The first stage is represented by the Assyro-Babylonian
' 0 "Very early in the thirteenth century we may see an abbot searching the register,
or rather the chest, of Jewish mortgages at York in quite modern fashion. A little
later an abbot of the same house, when buying land, has to buy up many encumbrances
that have been given to Jews, but has difficulty in doing so because some of them have
been transferred." 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 7 at 124.
11
MADOX. FORMULARE ANG.ICANum No. 331; 17 PIPE ROLL SOCIETY PuLBL. 26, 36,
158. 159, 173, 189.
1210 PIPE ROLL SOCIETY PUBL. 93-94; MADOX, op. cit. supra note 11, No. 315;
17 PIPE ROLL SOCIETY PURL. 47; 23 id. at 122-123; 24 id. at 212-213; 8 PIPE ROLL
SocIr
13

PURL. 168.

MADOX, op. cit. mupra note 11,

No. 326; CLOSE ROLLS (1268-1272) 262, 301-2, 413.
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deeds, and is continued with some modifications and additions in the Aramaic papyri of the fifth century B.C. The typical Assyrian warranty clause
reads:
Any return or plea or suit shall not be admitted. Whoever in future
or at any time shall set up a claim or dispute, whether it be D or his
sons or his brothers or any one belonging to him, who from S or his
sons shall seek to obtain a legal decision or lawsuit shall deposit five
minas of pure silver and so much precious gold in the treasury of the
God.... The money he shall
1 4return to its owners.... In his suit that he
brings he shall not prosper.
This clause obviously imposes upon the grantor, his heirs and representatives, the negative duty of refraining from attack upon the validity of the
transfer, providing for a penalty in case of breach of this duty, but it does
not impose upon him the positive duty of defending the grantee's title against
strangers.
A typical clause in the Aramaic papyri reads: "I shall have no power,
I Y, or any sons or fenale or male dependent of mine shall have no power
to set in motion suit or process against you, nor shall we have power to
sue son or daughter of yours, brother or sister, female or male dependent
of, yours, or any man to whom you may sell this house or to whom you
may give it as a gift."'15 The rest of this clause contains a provision for a
penalty in case a claim is asserted against the grantee, or his representatives, by the grantor, or his representatives, and also a provision that the
property is to remain to the grantee, notwithstanding the payment of the
penalty by the grantor.
The most important addition made in this clause, as compared with its
Assyrian predecessor, is that it includes within its scope the grantee's assigns by way of gift or sale. But the essential nature of the Assyrian warranty clause, imposing a negative duty upon the grantor and his representatives, still remains unchanged in the Aramaic papyri, although the
enumeration of possible contestants is more exhaustive in the latter than
in the former.
The second stage of the development of the warranty clause is found
in Demotic papyri, beginning with the seventh century B.C., in Neo-BabyIonian tablets of the Persian period, and in the Talmud. In a conveyance
dated between 645 and 640 B.C. the warranty clause reads as follows:
"The man who shall come unto thee on account of these shares above
144 JoHNs, ASSYRIAN DEEDS AND DOCUMENTS 10. See also PEISER, TEXTE JURISTIsCHEN UND
15

GESCHAFTLICHEN INHALTS,

CowLEY, ARAMAIC PAPYRI

Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek, Band 14, p. 71f.

No. 25. Italics added.

1944]

COMMON-LAW WARRANTY

written, I will cause him to be cleared [?] for thee from any patent in
the land.""6 In another deed of conveyance, dated 562 B.C. and representing the sale of a cow, the warranty clause reads: "He that shall come to
thee on account of her to take her from thee, saying, she is not thy cow,
I am he that will clear her for thee."'17 In a tablet dated in the 37th year
of Artaxerxes I (427 B.C.) and representing a lease for 60 years in which
the rent was paid in advance, there is a clause which is rendered by Clay,
the editor and translator, as follows: "In case a claim should arise against
the property, X [the lessor] shall settle the claim brought against the
property."' 8 In another place the same editor and translator renders this
clause somewhat differently: "If a claim should arise against that field,
X [the lessor] shall satisfy the claim against [dear the encumbrance of]
that field."' 1 By way of comment the editor adds: "In Aramaic nni means to
'Cleanse, purify, clear'. In legal parlance in Babylonian 'to clear of encumbrances'." Finally, a fragment of a warranty clause quoted in the Talmud
reads as follows: "I will acquit, clear, purify and confirm. . ...20
One might add parenthetically that there can be little doubt that all of
these three versions of the warranty clause, the Demotic, the Neo-Babylonian and the Talmudic are traceable to one common source, and that
they are not just the result of parallel development. It is sufficient to
163 CATALOGUE OF THE DEMOTIC PAPYRI IN THE JOHN RYLADs LIBRARY 44-47.

17d. at 59-60. See also Papyrus Strassburg 1, translated in CATALOGUE OF THE
DEMOTIC PAPYRI IN THE BRITISH MusEuM, pp. XXVII-XXXI. In the Demotic papyri
of the later Ptotelemaic period the warranty clause is more elaborate and contains
what we might call a covenant of further assurance. It reads as follows: "He that
shall come unto thee on account it in my name or in the name of any person whatsoever I will cause him to discharge thee. And I will purge them for thee from every
writing, every title, every right, every word whatsoever at any time. Thine are their
writings, its titles in every place in which they are. Every writing that has been made
concerning it, and every writing in the name of which I am justified [in my claim]
on it thine are they with the right conferred by them; thine is that to which my
claim is justified in its name. The oath [or] the proof that shall be imposed on thee
in the court of justice in the name of the right conferred by the above writing which
I have made unto thee to cause me to make it, I will make it without alleging any
title or anything whatsoever against thee." PAPYRUS ADLER DEM. 2 (123 B.C.).
189 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

BABYLONIAN EXPEDITION, SERIES A,

36-38.

198 id at 22. See also PEiSFR, BABYLONIScHE VERTRXGE DES BERLINER MUSEUMS .73.
The warranty clause in this document, which represents a deed of conveyance of a
slave, is rendered by Peiser as follows: "Am Tage, da man Zuruckforderungsldage
betreffs jenes Sclaven erhebt. soll Sum-iddina sein Recht an den Sclaven nachweisen ?]
und an Iddina-Nabu geben." Clay is of the opinion that the word 'umarraq,' which Peiser
translates by the phrase "sein Recht nachweisen," is to be rendered rather as "clear
of encumbrances." KOSCHAKER, BABYLoNIscH-AssYRIScHES BfRGSCAFTSRECHT 192193, states that he is inclined to agree with Clay. In the light of the Egyptian papyri
cited in the two preceding notes, and of the fragment of the warranty clause from the
Talmud
there can be no doubt that Clay's translation is the correct one.
20
BABYLON IAN TALMUD, BABA METZIA fol. 16a.
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point to the word denoting the grantor's duty to clear the property of
encumbrances or adverse claims. In both the tablets and the Talmud the
same Aramaic word vin. meaning to purge or cleanse of impurities, is
used, and in the Demotic papyri a word is used which is similarly rendered
by the translator by the English words "clear" or "purge." The use of this
term in all of these versions in the same derivative sense of freeing property from encumbrances could not possibly have occurred by accident.
The warranty clause in the Hebrew documents of the Middle Ages reads,
with some minor variations, as follows: "And whoever shall come from the
four winds of the world, man or wonman., Jew or Gentile, son or daughter,
heir or legatee, near or far, who shall arise and contrive and make any
claim or requisition whatsoever on the said William, or his heirs or representatives, regarding the said house With the court and appurtenances, it
will be obligatory upon me, my heirs and representatives, to free them
and protect them against those claimants, and to maintain their possession
of the house, court and appurtenances aforesaid, in peace and comfort [peaceably and quietly], on the surety of all my property, landed or movable,
2
which I now possess or may in future acquire." '
It is fairly obvious that this formula combines all the elements of the
Assyrian, Aramaic and Demotic-Talmudic warranty clauses with some
additions and modifications. The detailed enumeration of the possible contestants is, except for the characteristically Jewish "Jew or Gentile," still
substantially the same as that in the Assyrian and Aramaic deeds. The
inclusion of the grantee's assigns within the scope of the warranty is the
same as in the Aramaic papyri. Finally, the assumption by the grantor of
the positive duty of defending the grantee's title is the same as in the
Neo-Babylonian-Demotic-Talmudic formula. The new element in this formula is the opening phrase, "And whoever shall come from the four winds
of the world." This is explainable in the light of a certain analysis of warranty found in the Talmud. 22 According to the Talmud there are three
21

1ABRAHAMS,

STOKES AND LOEWE,

STARRS AND JEWISH CHARTERS IN THE BRITISH

(1280) 109. For similar clauses see DAVIS, HEBREW
Nos. 3, 11, 26, 29, 33, 35, 39, 44, 45, 46 (a conveyance by a Jew

DEEDS (Shtaroth)
to a non-Jew), 48.
Substantially the same formula is found in the FORMULARY OF RABBI JUDAH BARZILLAI

MUSEUM

(11th century, Spain) No. 26. pp. 45-46. In a deed of conveyance made at Lon in
the year 1053 and published in 4 Rdvue des ttudes Juives, 227-229, the warranty clause,
in French translation, reads as follows: 'Et vienne, d'un des quatre coins du monde,
fils, file, fr~re, soeur, parent, 6tranger, successeur ou .h~ritier, Juif ou non-Juif, verbalement ou par 6crit et soul~ve au sujet de cette vente une contestation quelconque, ses
paroles seront nulles et consid6r6s comme un tesson brise, qui n'a point de valeur, i
charge pour moi de r6pousser et rendre vaine toute contestation et r~lamation de
faqon
A la maintenir dans son droit d'un maintien complet et d'une conservation complite."
22
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KETUBOT fol. 91b-92a.
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kinds of warranty: (1) Warranty against the acts of the grantor himself;
(2) warranty against those claiming through the grantor, such as his heirs
or creditors; (3) warranty against "the whole world." A famous tenthcentury Hebrew authority 23 arranges these types of warranty in an ascending order, the lowest on the scale being warranty against the acts of the
grantor and the highest being warranty against the whole world. He adds
that each type of warranty includes the one or the ones below it on the
scale and excludes the one or the ones above it. Thus where a deed contains an express warranty against the acts of the grantor, the other two
types of warranty are excluded. Where it contains a warranty against those
claiming through the grantor, warranty against the grantor's own acts is
included and warranty against the whole world is excluded. Where it contains warranty against the whole world, the other two types are included.
The phrase "If anyone should come from the four winds of the world"
was apparently intended to convey the idea of a warranty against the whole
world. Although this all-inclusive phrase made the specific enumeration of
possible contestants superfluous, if not confusing and ambiguous, draftsmen. with the conservatism characteristic of the legal profession, continued to include the enumeration in their formulas.
Influence of the Jewish Formula upon the Structure of the Enqlish Warranty Clause.
In the light of the above discussion, the phrase "Contra omnes homines
et foeminas, Christianos et Judeos" in the medieval English warranty
clause becomes intelligible. It was borrowed verbatim from the Jewish warranty clause, and the "omnes homines et foeminas" part of it is, as we have
seen above, traceable as far back as the Aramaic papyri of the fifth century B.C. This is what the writer had in mind when he said that the
English warranty clause bears unmistakable signs of its Jewish origin. For,
while it may be difficult to prove that the idea of warranty and the rules
flowing out of the warranty clause were borrowed by one system of law
from another, since in such matters it is almost impossible to eliminate
the possibility of parallel development, the use of such quaint phrases as
the one referred to above falls into a different classification. Here this
possibility is so remote that it may safely be disregarded.
Having thus shown that at least part of the medieval English warranty
clause was borrowed from the Jews, we shall now consider the three operative words of the medieval English warranty clause, "warrantizare, defendere
et acquietare," which are to this day found in our deeds in their English
23

RAv HAi GAON, MEKAR

UmIrIK.%R,

c. 28.
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form "warrant, defend and acquit." Of these the first one was probably
borrowed from the procedure in the action of theft, the actio furti, where
the common defence was the voucher of a warrantor. 24 "Defendere" and
"acquietare," on the other band, are translations of equivalent Hebrew terms.
The term nv'5 which corresponds to "acquietare" is found in almost
every one of the available Hebrew deeds from Angevin England,2 and was
certainly not borrowed by the Jews from the English, since it is also found
in the fragment of the warranty clause quoted in the Talmud and referred to above. The equivalent of the term "defendere," 4WLk,1 , occurs in
several Hebrew deeds from England2 6 and in the Formulary of Rabbi
Judah Barzillai..2 7 Here again, as in the case of the phrase "Contra onmes
homines" etc., it is fairly obvious that the English adopted these terms from
the Jews.
It should be borne in mind that the warranty clause was not the only
legal form which the English adopted from the Jews. The writer has
shown elsewhere 28 that the classical English mortgage in the form of an
absolute conveyance and a condition subsequent, and the conditional bond
in the form of an absolute obligation with an avoidance clause, were borrowed by the English from the Jews. The position of the Jews in England
during the twelfth and a good part of the thirteenth century was such that
it was almost inevitable that they should have exercized an important influence upon the development of English legal forms and devices, which
were then in their formative stage. The Jews were the principal financiers
and money-lenders in England during that period, and their financial transactions were numerous and involved large amounts of money.9 They
brought with them to England a highly developed system of law and a
large number of legal forms and devices. The idea of warranty was particularly well developed among them. The analysis of warranty quoted above
from the Talmud is as valid today as it was in the fourth century. In England there was hardly a transaction among the Jews to which there was
not attached some kind of warranty. To what point of refinement the
Jews of medieval England carried the idea of warranty is illustrated by
the following example. Long before the common law laboriously worked
out an adequate method of dealing with an assignment of a chose in action,
24

See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 663.
25See
note 21 supra.
26
DAvis, op. cit. mpra note 21, Nos. 3, 5, 11, 26, 29, 33, 35, 39, 52.
27
DAvis, op. cit. supra note 21, No. 26.
28See
See RsBiNowrrz, The Common Law Mortgage and The Conditional Bond (1943)
922 U.
of PA. L. REv. 179-194.
9
See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. snpra note 2, at 469; 2 id at 118-119.
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the Jews of England were dealing in bonds and recognizances pretty much
in the same way in which banks today deal in commercial paper. Among
the available Hebrew documents from England there are quite a few assignments of debts. Since the Jewish bond carried with it a general lien on
the real property of the debtor, and therein lay its main value, the assignor
would warrant that there were -no other bonds outstanding against the
debtor."" This is, of course, an exact counterpart of a warranty against prior
encumbrances in our modern mortgage.
An interesting bit of evidence of the Jewish origin of the medieval English
warranty clause is found in Y.B. 30 Edw. I where there is almost contemporary testimony to that effect. At page 190 Brumpton, J. says:
"The word 'defend' was used when the Jews were in the land, and was
first provided to meet their case." What is true of "defend" is also true
of "acquit" and of warranty in general, although at the end of the thirteenth
century warranty had become so much a part of English law that its origin had
been entirely forgotten. What Brumpton, J. save about "defend" having been
first provided to meet the case of the Jews, that is, of Jewish debts outstanding against the property being conveyed, is, of course, entirely in line
with what the writer has said at the beginning of this article about the
Jews having created a situation which called for some such device as a
warranty.
Je ish Derivation of the Rules Governing

'arranty
Together with the warranty clause some of the important rules governing warranty of real property were borrowed by the English from the
Jews. One of these is the rule giving the remote grantee a right to enforce
the warranty against the original grantor. Mr. Justice Holmes in his book
The Common Law devotes a whole chapter of profound learning to the
origin of this rule.3 1 He traces it to the identification of the heir with his
ancestor, which is found in early Roman law as well as in Germanic law,
and to the notion that the assign is a quasi-heir. However, the solution of
this problem seems to be much simpler than that. The right is traceable
to the inclusion of the assign within the scope of the warranty which, as
we have seen above, is found in the standard Hebrew warranty clause and
goes as far back as the Aramaic papyri of the fifth century B.C. English
conveyancers simply borrowed this feature of the warranty clause together
with the rest of the clause.
3
OSee e.g., 3 CALENDAR OF THE PLEA ROLLS OF THE ExcHEQUER OF THE JEWS (published
by The Jewish Historical Society of England) 206, 207-208.
31
HOLMES. THE CoxttoN LAW (1881) 371-409.
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Furthermore, the inclusion of assigns within the scope of the warranty
was rendered necessary by the introduction of the "Jewish gage" which,
as we have seen above, constituted a general lien upon the debtor's real
property. If an owner of real property could be divested of his property
through the enforcement of a lien created by a party other than his immediate grantor, it was natural to provide him with a remedy over against
that party.
It is true, as Mr. Justice Holmes has pointed out, that Bracton speaks
in several places of the assign as "quasi-heres," and explains his right
to enforce the warranty on this ground. But this is probably a bit of medieval scholasticism attempting to find a formal ground for a rule dictated
32
by practical considerations.
It seems to the writer that the assign's right to sue the original grantor
on his warranty was, at least in Hebrew law, based upon the same principle as that of the remote holder of negotiable paper to sue the maker.
Warranty of real property is a perfectly natural intermediate step between
the strictly personal nonassignable obligation and the impersonal freely
transferable negotiable instrument. When negotiable instruments came into
vogue among the Jews, the difficulty which Jewish jurists saw in their enforcement was that the obligation seemingly ran to an unknown person. It was
argued that the instrument should be invalid for lack of definiteness, which
is a necessary requisite of every enforceable obligation. However, a great
thirteenth century Jewish jurist held that where the obligee is ascertainable
in the future, although he is unknown at the time the instrument is drawn,
the requirement of definiteness is fully satisfied. 33 In support of his opinion,
interestingly enough, the learned Rabbi cited the biblical case of Saul offering a reward to whomsoever will defeat Goliath. In the case of a warranty
running to the grantee and his assigns, Jewish jurists apparently saw no
32Id. at 373-374. Holmes quotes Bracton, fol. 176, to the effect that assigns had
the right to sue the original grantor on the warranty only where they were
named in the warranty clause, that is, where the warranty ran to the grantee, his
heirs and assigns. This would seem to indicate tlhat the practice of including assigns
within the scope. of the warranty preceded the rule giving them a right to sue the
original grantor, and that the courts only recognized the validity of a device which
had been introduced by conveyancers.
It seems that at the time when warranty of real property was introduced in England
in the twelfth century, the civil law maxim of Nemno alteri stipidari potest had not yet
been adopted in England. Conveyancers therefore saw no difficulty in making the
warranty run to assigns who were not parties to the transaction between the grantor
and the grantee. Bracton's theory of the assign being a quasi-heir may have been
prompted by a desire on his part to reconcile the assign's right to sue on the warranty
with
the above maxim of the Roman law.
33
RESPONSA OF RABBr ASHER BEN YEHIEL. c. 68, § 9.
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difficulty because the warranty could be enforced only by one who was the
owner of the property, and this was considered a sufficient description of
the obligee to satisfy the requirement of definiteness.
That some such notion also prevailed among Englishmen may be seen
from the warranty clause in a certain charter dated 1202. This warranty
clause reads: "I, the aforesaid Roger and my heirs, will finally warrant
to the aforesaid Peter and his heirs, or to whomever they give, sell or
assign them, against all men and women; and this my charter becomes for
them a warranty even as to the aforesaid Peter. '3 4 The assigns are thus
put on a par with the grantee with regard to the warranty. Their right, like
his, is based upon the charter, that is,upon the promise running to them
directly, and not upon the promise to the grantee by representation.
We shall now return to a consideration of the rule that the obligation of
the warranty constitutes an in rem charge upon the property of the warrantor. Ths rule is easily explainable if we assume the Hebrew origin of the
English warranty. It is a cardinal principle of the Hebrew law of obligations that every obligation, whether originating in a loan of money35 or in
a warranty incidental to the conveyance of real property36 or in the endowment of the wife by the husband, when embodied in a writing executed in
the presence of at least two witnesses, carries with it a general lien upon
all of the obligor's property. This principle is known in Hebrew law as
"ahrayut," a word which denotes what is probably the most fertile concept
in Hebrew law. Freely rendered it means that all of the obligor's property stands surety for the discharge of the obligation assumed by him.
Originally, the creditor's lien attached only to the debtor's immovable property. At a later period it was held 38 that by inserting a special provision
to that effect in the bond the lien could be extended to the debtor's movable
property. At a somewhat earlier period the question was raised by the
34 See ADLER,
JEWS IN MEDIEvAL ENGLAND 263-266, where the original is copied in
full and translated from a manuscript preserved in the Library of St. Paul's Cathedral.
The writer's attention has been called to the English practice whereby the grantee

of land received the accumulation of deeds which his grantor had received from his
predecessors;

and it has been suggested that this practice strengthens the analogy

between the right of the holder of a negotiable instrument to sue on the instrument
and that of the assign to sue on the warranty.
The writer wishes to add that the language of the warranty clause quoted in the
text seems to bear out the above suggestion. It was apparently contemplated by the
parties that if the grantee should transfer the property to another, the assign would
receive the original deed, and that his right to sue the original grantor on the warranty would be predicated upon his holding of that deed.
35
MIsHNA, BABA BATHRA. 10, 8.
36
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BARA METZIA, fol. 15b.
37
MISHNA, KETUBOT, 8, 8.
38
BABYLONIAN

TALMUD, BABA BATHRA, fol. 44b.
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Babylonian Master Samuel3 9 as to whether or not the debtor could validly
subject his future acquisitions to the lien of the creditor. By analogy with
conveyance of property, it was argued by some, that a lien on property
to be acquired in the future by the debtor should be ineffective just as
a sale of such property would be ineffective. The conclusion of the Talmud,
however, is that a lien is not to be likened to a conveyance. In the postTalmudic period the practice became universal to incorporate in every writing of an obligatory nature a provision for a lien on the obligor's property,
movable and immovable, present and future. 40
It is to be noted here that the idea of "ahrayut," that is, of subjecting all
of the obligor's property to the lien of the creditor, may not have been
altogether original with the Jews. In a Neo-Babylonian debenture of the
early part of the seventh century B.C. we find it stated: ".

.

. all his prop-

erty, in town and country, all that there is shall be a pledge for . . .
another creditor has no right of disposal over it until . . -gets his money,
fully repaid." 41 This was apparently a general charge upon the obligor's
property in favor of the obligee, without delivery of possession, exactly as
in the Jewish bonds.
A still closer approximation to the formula of the Hebrew bond with
"ahrayut" is found in the Demotic bond of the Ptolemaic era in Egypt.
The lien formula in the Demotic papyri usually reads as follows: "All of
everything that belongeth to me and those things that I shall gain are in
pledge for every word that is above, until we do according to them, of
necessity without delay." 42 This, it will readily be seen, is an almost exact
9
3 Id. at fol. 157a-157b; SHU.nAN
Hebrew
law) c. 112, § 1:
40

ARUiK, HosHEN MIIHPAT (the standard code of

See, e.g., FORMULARY OF RABBI JUDAH BARZILLAI, no. 34; DAVIS, op. cit. stpra
note 21, Nos. 23, 47, 54. This standardized formula was used by the Jews of medieval
England in the bonds which they took from their non-Jewish debtors, and it gave
rise to what came to be known as the "Jewish gage." See SELECT PLEAS FROM THE ExCHEQUER OF THE JEWS, op. cit. supra note 9 at 33, 93, 94. From the Jewish bonds this
formula apparently passed into general use so that thirteenth century English bonds commonly contain a provision binding the obligor's property, movable and immovable. See
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2. The provision for binding the
obligor's future acquisitions, although it does not occur in English bonds with that
regularity with which we find it in Hebrew writings of an obligatory nature, is also
found in numerous thirteenth century transactions between non-Jews, where the formula
reads "Obligo omnia bona mea, mobilia et immobilia. presentia et futura," or, sometimes. 'habita et habenda." See e.g., CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS (1268-1272) 243,
258.
4 300, 410-411.

1Henry

F. Lutz, A NFo-BABYLON'IAN DEBE.TURE, 10 UNIv. OF CAL. PE71L. IN SEMrrlc

PHILOLOGY,
No. 9, 251-256.
42
See e.g., P. ADLE:R. DEm. 4, 5. 6, 11. The Demotic bond is strikingly similar to the
Hebrew bond in still another respect. The former contains a provision to the effect
that the obligor shall not be able to plead payment as long as the bond remains in the
hands of the obligee. "'We shall not be able to say 'we have given thee silver, corn or
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counterpart of the Hebrew formula, the only difference being that the
Hebrew bonds, in accordance with the Talmudic principle referred to
above, specify movable and immovable property, while the Demotic bond
speaks of "all of everything that belongeth to me."
It thus appears that the idea of "ahrayut" is a very old one and that
it developed in the cultural and economic sphere of which the Jews of Talmudic times were a part. The question of who originated this idea is not
important for our purposes. It is certain, however, that this idea took firm
root in Hebrew law and became the central core of the Hebrew law of obligations. As indicated above, there is not a single Hebrew writing of an obligatory nature which does not have "ahrayut" attached to it. What is more,
"ahrayut" is implied in law even when it is omitted from the writing. In
the language of the Talmud3 the omission is presumed to be an error of
the scrivener. In all of the available Hebrew deeds of conveyance from England there is not a single one which does not carry a warranty, and there
is not a single warranty which does not carry with it a charge on the waranything whatsoever' without proved receipt; we shall not be able to say 'we have

performed for thee the right of the contract' while the above contract is in my hand."
A similar provision is found in the medieval Hebrew bond. See e.g., DAvIs, op.
cit. supra note 21, No. 24, 31, 83. In No. 24 the provision in question reads: "And
as long as this bond is in the hands of R. Abraham R. Elijah shall not be believed,
if he should say 'I have paid,' save by a receipt signed by his [R. Abraham's] own

hand."
As far as the writer was able to ascertain, none of the commentators on the legal

papyri correctly understood the significance of the above provision in the Demotic bond.

Nor were they aware of the existence of a similar provision in the medieval Hebrew
bond. In the writer's opinion this is one of the many instances in which the answer

to a perplexing question with regard to the Egyptian papyri may be found in the

Talmud and in medieval Hebrew legal forms. As far as the Hebrew bonds are concerned there is no difficulty in ascertaining its significance. There is in the

TALMUD,

SHFBuoru, fol. 41b. a rule to the effect that where one borrows money from another
in the presence of witnesses he is not required to pay in the presence of witnesses,
so that a plea of payment by the boirower is sufficient, even when not supported by
the testimony of witnesses. However, where the loan it evidenced by a writing this
rule does not apply, and the borrower cannot plead payment if the lender produces the
writing. The above provision was therefore intended to state in specific terms the
effect that the writing was to have upon a plea of payment by the borrower.
The presence of a similar provision in the Demotic bond at once suggested to the
writer that a rule similar to the one just cited from the Talmud must have prevailed
in Egypt. Indeed, such a rule is ascribed by Diodorus to King Bocchoris (eighth century
B.C.). As translated in 3 CATAuOGUE OF TnE DEMOTIC PAPYRI IN THE JoHN RYLANDS
LmRARY, introd. p. 10, this rule reads: "Persons who have contracted a debt without
a written agreement, and deny that they owe it, after taking an oath, are freed from

the debt."
It should also be noted here that a similar provision is found in CowtY, ARx. ic
PAPYRI, No. 10 (456 B.C.) where it reads: "And I shall have no power to say to you
that I have paid you your money and the interest on it while this deed is in your
hand." Diodorus' statement about. the law that prevailed in Egypt thus receives indirect
confirmation
from legal forms used there as early as the fifth century B.C.
4
3BABY-.ONrAN TALMuD, BABA METZIA, fol. 15b.
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rantor's property, movable and immovable, present and future. It was this
idea of "ahrayut," borrowed by the English from the Jews together with the
warranty clause, which was responsible for the rule that a warranty creates
44
an in rem. charge upon the property of the warranfor.
II.

ORIGIN OF THE INCHOATE RIGHT OF DOWER

This brings us to a consideration of the inchoate right of dower. Briefly
stated, it is the contingent right which a woman has, during her husband's
lifetime, to have a life estate in one-third of the real property which her
husband owned during coverture set off to her, if she should survive him.
Hazeltine, with a great deal of insight, puts this right of the married woman
in the same class with the right of the grantee to enforce a warranty, as
constituting an in rem charge upon land in medieval England. But he was
unaware of the fact that these apparently disconnected rules of law are
traceable to one common source and spring from one root-idea, namely, that
of "ahrayut."
A comparison of English medieval law and practice with Hebrew l~w
and practice, ancient and medieval, on the same subject will, the writer
believes, make this abundantly clear. 'Pollock and Maitland have this to
say about the wife's rights during marriage in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries:
The unspecified dower is therefore treated as a charge on all the
husband's lands, a charge that ought to be satisfied primarily out of
those lands which descend to the heir, but yet one that can be enforced, if need' be, against the husband's feoffees. If, however, we go
back to Glanvill, we shall apparently find him doubting whether, even
in the case of a specified dower, a widow ought ever to attack her husband's feoffees, at all events if the heir has land out of which her
claim can be satisfied.
Some hesitation about this matter was not unnatural, for our law
was but slowly coming to a decision of the question whether and how
the land burdened with dower can be effectually alienated during the
marriage. The abundant charters of the twelfth century' seem to show
that, according to common opinion, the husbafnd could riot as a general
rule bar the wife's right without her consent, that he could bar it
44
An interesting document, showing the close relationship between the English warranty clause and its Hebrew equivalent, is found in MADOX, op. cit. supra note 11, at
No. 119 (1287). The grantor, after stating that he is bound to warrant, defend and
acquit the grantee, proceeds to state that in case of failure on his part to do so, all

his property, movable and immnovable, present and future, shall be bound for the pay-

ment of the damages the grantee m'ay sustain by reason of such failure. This, it will
readily be seen, is an almost perfect specimen of a Hebrew warranty clause with
'ahrayut.' Cf. documents cited in note 21 supra.
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with her consent, and that (though this may45be less certain) her consent might be valid though not given in court.
It appears from the above quotation that the rule giving the wife a charge
upon her husband's property for the enforcement of her dower developed
slowly in England, and that the common opinion in the twelfth century
was in advance of that of the judges in this respect. While Glanvill was
still hesitating about the widow's right to claim dower in lands conveyed
by her husband during his lifetime, the practice of obtaining the wife's consent to a grant by her husband, for the purpose of barring her right of
dower, had become general.
As for the Jews, this practice prevailed among them for at least a thousand years prior to their settlement in England. A rule ascribed by the
Talmud 46 to Simeon B. Shatech (second century B.C.) subjects all of the husband's property to a charge in favor of the wife for the enforcement of her
dower rights. As a result of this rule the practice developed to have the
wife release her dower rights in the property which the husband was about
to convey. Such a release is mentioned already in the Mishna. 47
It is to be noted here that this practice of obtaining the married woman's
release before a conveyance was made by her husband is also found in
Demotic papyri of the third century B.C. and later. The following is an
example:
Whereas a woman of alimony, owner of money-payment . . . his
wife saith. Take a writing from ... my husband to make him do according to every word above. My heart agrdeth with it, whereas I have claim
on him by the right conferred by the writing of alimony and the writing of money-payment which he made unto me to perform for me the
right conferred by it at any time, and I am without claim on thee in the
above [mentioned] dry vacant plot which makes 481Y2 cubits of land
of necessity, without delay, without any compulsion.
Among the Jews of medieval England the practice continued in pretty
452
46

47

POLLOCK & MAITLAND, Op.

cit. mipra note 2, at 423-424.

BABYLONIAN TALzxUD, KETuBoT,

fol. 82b.

10, 6.
48p. ADLER DEM. 2, and P. RYL. 17. See also I CATALOGUE OF THE DEMOTIC PAPYRI
IN THE BRITISH MusEUM 34-36 (284 B.C.). It seems that neither the editor of the
Rylands papyri nor the editor of the British Museum papyri fully understood the legal
significance of these releases. They thought that in these cases the property conveyed
MIsHNA, KETUBOT,

had been mortgaged by the husband to the wife. However, the language of these
releases, together with the release of dower mentioned in MISHNA, KEruBOT, 10, 6,
clearly indicates that there had been no mortgage to the wife in the usual sense, but
that the property conveyed, as well as all other property which the husband may have
owned, was charged with the wife's dower, and that the wife released the property from
this charge.
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much the same way as in Talmudic times. Among the available Hebrew
deeds of conveyance in England, from Jew to Jew and from Jew to nonJew, there are hardly any which are not accompanied by a release by the
grantor's wife.49 The adoption by the English of the above practice would
have been sufficient to give rise to the rule that where there was no release
by the wife the property conveyed by the husband during his lifetime remained subject to dower. There is also strong evidence to the effect that
the formula of the Jewish "Kethuba," or endowment document, binding
all of the husband's property for the payment of the dower, was similarly
adopted by the English. In Blackstone, v. II, p. 134, note p, we read:
"When the wife was endowed generally ... the husband seems to have said,
'with all my lands and tenements I thee endow,' and then they all became
liable to her dower. When he endowed her with personalty only, he used
to say, 'with all my wordly goods' (or, as the Salisbury ritual has it,
'with all my worldly chattel') 'I thee endow'." These formulae, which were
used for the purpose of creating a charge upon the husband's property in
favor of the woman, are strikingly similar to that part of the Hebrew
"Kethuba," which was used for the same purpose and which reads as
follows f "I take upon myself and my heirs the responsibility of this marriage contract, . . . so that all this shall be paid from the best part of my
property, real and personal, that I now possess or may hereafter acquire."'50
It is true that while this similarity is very suggestive, it is not conclusive of the Hebrew origin of the English formulae. There is, however, one
bit of evidence, again in the form of a quaint phrase no one has hitherto
thought necessary to* explain, which tells the story most eloquently. In
his chapter on Dower, sections 48 and 49, Littleton describes a certain kind
of dower, which he calls "Doumzent de la pluis beale" and which, he says,
would arise under the following circumstances: A man died seised of certain
land, part of which he held of one lord by knight's service and the other
part of another in socage. He left a widow and a son under age. The lord
under whom the deceased held by knight's service entered upon the land,
held under him, as guardian in chivalry, and the widow entered upon the
other land as guardian in socage. If the widow brought a writ of dower
against the guardian in chivalry he could plead the above matter, "and pray
that it may be adjudged by the court that the wife may endow her selfe de
49

See e.g. DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 21, No. 29, 44, 50, 100.
507 JEwISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 472. See also, MAIMONIDES, YAD HA-CHAZAKA, YIBBUM
VE-CHALIZA, c. 4, § 33, for the full text of the Jewish "Kethuba," and 5 McCLiNTOCX
& STRONG, CYCLOPEDIA OF BIBLICAL, THEOLOGICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL LITERATURE 776,
for an English translation.
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la pluis beale, i. e. of the most faire of the tenements which she hath as
guardian in socage."
Why, it may be asked, was the widow to' endow herself of the fairest
part of the land? Was this an act of chivalry toward the lady on the part
of the guardian in chivalry? This might have been so had he offered her
part of what he himself held in guardianship, but not when he insisted
that she obtain her dower from the land which was held by her husband in
socage, and of which she herself was the guardian.
The writer believes that only a reference to the Hebrew "Kethuba" formula quoted above will furnish the answer. It will be recalled that this
fornmula states that the woman is to be paid from "the best part" of her
husband's property, a phrase which is almost identical with Littleton's "de
la pluis beale." Littleton's phrase is apparently a relic of the old English
endowment formula which was copied from the Jewish "Kethuba." It did
not come into existence by accident, just as the equivalent Hebrew phrase
did not find its way into the "Kethuba" by accident. The Hebrew phrase
has a long history behind it, and the reason for its insertion in the "Kethuba"
is to be found in a certain rule of the Hebrew law of execution going back
to the time of the Mishna, that is, at least to the second century. In
Mishna Gittin, 5, 1 we read: "Compensation for damage is paid out of
property of the best quality, a creditor out of land of medium quality, and
a woman's kethubah out of land of the poorest quality."
It should be added by way of explanation that the term "n'zikin" in the
original, which the translator renders by the English term "damage," means
damage resulting from a tortious act. The rule of the above Mishna, therefore, is that a judgment creditor of a tortfeasor is to collect from property
of the best quality; a lender, who became a creditor voluntarily, is to collect from property of medium quality; and the woman is to collect her
dower from the poorest quality, since, in the words of the Talmud, she is
more anxious to get married than the husband is.
In order to overcome this rule of the Mishna, placing the woman in an
inferior position, it became customary among the Jews to insert in the
"Kethuba" a definite provision to the effect that the woman is to collect
her dower from the best part of her husband's property. The English
apparently copied this provision from the Jews together with other provisions of the Hebrew "Kethuba."
III

CONCLUSION

The warranty clause in the conveyance of real property was introduced
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in England by the Jews in substantially the same form in which it had been
used by them for many centuiries prior to their settlement in England. Some
of the elements of this clause are of great antiquity, going as far back as the
Assyro-Babylonian tablet deeds.
The rule of Anglo-American law giving the remote grantee a remedy
against the original grantor for the enforcement of the warranty is traceable to the inclusion of assigns within the scope of the warranty, a feature
which is characteristic of the Hebrew warranty clause as well as of the
warranty clause in the Aramaic papyri of the fifth century B.C. Similarly,
the rule that gave the grantee an in rem charge upon the property of the
grantor for the enforcement of the warranty is traceable to a rule of the
Hebrew law of obligations which provides for such a charge in favor of
the obligee, as an incident of every obligation embodied in a written document and executed with certain required formalities.
The inchoate right of dower, which gives the widow a charge upon all
the real property owned by her husband during coverture, is of similar
origin. The endowment document was treated in Hebrew law, as well as
in Egyptian law of the Ptolemaic period, like any other obligation, so that
it gave rise to a charge upon the husband's property in favor of the wife,
and the Hebrew "Kethuba" states so specifically. The English adopted this
feature of the Hebrew "Kethuba" together with some of -its other provisions. The most definite trace of Hebrew influence upon the development
of the English endowment document is found in the medieval English dower
de la plus belle, which originated in a provision in the Hebrew "Kethuba"
giving the Wife the right to collect her dower from the best part of her
husband's property.
Though questioned by the author (see stpra page 86 et seq.), the explanation offered
by Mr. Justice Holmes for the ability of the grantee of a covenantee to sue upon the
covenant seems to be accepted by a prominent worker in the field of running covenants.
See Sims, The Future of Real Covenants: Objection to Restatement of Property
Treatment of Covenants, supra this issue at page 5.-ED.

